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Abstract
A 2015 experiment by Hanson and Delft colleagues provided further confirmation 
that the quantum world violates the Bell inequalities, being the first Bell test to close 
two known experimental loopholes simultaneously. The experiment was also taken 
to provide new evidence of ‘spooky action at a distance’. Here we argue for cau‑
tion about the latter claim. The Delft experiment relies on entanglement swapping, 
and our main claim is that this geometry introduces an additional loophole in the 
argument from violation of the Bell inequalities to action at a distance: the apparent 
action at a distance may be an artifact of ‘collider bias’. In the absence of retrocau‑
sality, the sensitivity of such experiments to this ‘Collider Loophole’ (CL) depends 
on the temporal relation between the entanglement swapping measurement C and 
the two measurements A and B between which we seek to infer a causal connection. 
CL looms large if the C is in the future of A and B, but not if C is in the past. The 
Delft experiment itself is the intermediate case, in which the separation is spacelike. 
We argue that this leaves it vulnerable to CL, unable to establish conclusively that it 
avoids it.
Keywords Nonlocality · Action at a distance · Entanglement swapping · Collider 
bias
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1 Introduction
In 2015, Ronald Hanson and colleagues at Delft reported the first of an important 
new class of ‘Bell tests’—i.e., experimental confirmations that the quantum world 
violates the Bell inequalities [1]. The Delft experiment was the first Bell test to close 
both of two well‑known experimental loopholes, the so‑called detection and locality 
loopholes. Previous Bell tests had closed one or the other, but not both simultane‑
ously. As the Delft authors note , their experiment exploits ‘[a]n elegant approach 
for realizing a loophole‑free setup ... proposed by Bell himself’ [1, p. 3]. The same 
approach has now been taken by several other experiments [2–4].
The Delft experiment was widely hailed as a further important confirmation of 
quantum ‘action at a distance’ (AAD). Media coverage presented the experiment 
as good news for AAD and hence as bad news for Einstein: “The most rigorous 
test of quantum theory ever carried out has confirmed that the ‘spooky action‑at‑a‑
distance’ that [Einstein] famously hated ... is an inherent part of the quantum world,” 
as a report in Nature put it [5].
Here we argue that this conclusion needs a large caveat. The Delft experiment 
does, as claimed, do a convincing job of closing experimental loopholes in the pro‑
ject of showing that nature violates the Bell inequalities. But the step from violation 
of the Bell inequalities to AAD involves a sensitivity to experimental geometry that 
has not previously been recognised, so far as we are aware. Our goal in this paper is 
to call attention to this issue, using the Delft experiment and some variants of it as a 
framework for our discussion.
The issue arises because, unlike previous Bell tests, such experiments make use 
of entanglement swapping. Their spacetime geometry thus has a ∨∨ shape, rather 
than the ∨ shape of previous experiments. The central vertex of the ∨∨ is a meas‑
urement whose result (if suitable) confirms an entanglement between the particles 
measured at the outer vertices. We will show that this geometry may permit an alter‑
native explanation of the observed Bell correlations across the ∨∨ , not requiring 
AAD. The apparent causal influence may be a selection artifact, of a kind familiar 
in the causal modelling literature, rendered possible in this case by the role of the 
central measurement.
Specifically, the central measurement is a ‘collider’ in causal modelling terms, 
with the result that apparent causal influence across the ∨∨ may be an artifact of 
so‑called ‘collider bias’. (We explain these terms below.) This means that such an 
experiment may provide no evidence of AAD in its own case – i.e., across the ∨∨ 
as a whole1 – despite confirming predictions that seem to mandate AAD in other 
geometries. We will call this the Collider Loophole (CL).
We will show that under standard assumptions, vulnerability of such experiments 
to CL depends on the spacetime location of the central vertex of the ∨∨ with respect 
to the outer vertices. Cross‑∨∨ AAD is highly questionable if the central vertex lies 
1 We emphasise that the argument is not a challenge to the claim that there is AAD within the two ∨
‑shaped wings of the experiment. As we will argue, however, this need not add up to AAD across the ∨∨ 
as a whole.
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in the absolute future of the outer vertices, but not if it lies in their absolute past. 
Interestingly, the Delft experiment itself is the intermediate case, in which this sepa‑
ration is spacelike. We will argue that in the light of this, the case for AAD across 
the ∨∨ in the Delft experiment is weaker than in the subsequent similar experiments, 
in which the central vertex lies in the overlap of the past light cones of the outer 
vertices.
The sensitivity of CL to the location of the central vertex depends on the assump‑
tion that there is no retrocausality in play. This may seem uncontroversial, but it is 
has been challenged in this context, an option that has been held to provide a dif‑
ferent reason for questioning the inference from violation of the Bell inequalities to 
AAD. Retrocausal models allow causality ‘across the ∨ ’ in conventional ∨‑shaped 
Bell experiments, but take it to be indirect: the causal influence is said to take a 
zig zag path, along the two arms of the ∨ . The result is spacelike causality, with‑
out direct AAD. The claimed advantage is that by keeping direct causal influences 
within the light cones, such models may be easier than conventional models to rec‑
oncile with special relativity; see [6–10] for recent discussions. In the present paper 
we ignore this option. A No Retrocausality Assumption (NoRA) plays a crucial role 
in our argument, supporting the case for the existence of the Collider Loophole in 
some ∨∨ geometries but not others.2
The paper goes like this. Section 2 deals with preliminaries. We introduce entan‑
glement swapping, and a variant of it known as delayed choice entanglement swap‑
ping (DCES). We summarise recent discussion in the literature about the ontological 
status of the entanglement produced by DCES. In particular, we explain the com‑
mon view that DCES does not create ‘genuine’ entanglement, and that the appear‑
ance that it does so is an artifact of post‑selection. We also introduce the notions of 
colliders and collider bias from the causal modelling literature.
In Sect. 3 we describe the Delft experiment, and then apply the lessons of Sect. 2 
to a hypothetical variant of it, conducted with DCES. We show that in this DCES 
variant, it would be highly questionable whether violation of the Bell inequalities 
would reflect any real AAD across the ∨∨ geometry of the experiment as a whole. 
The alternative is that the Bell correlations are an artifact of collider bias. We give 
two reasons for thinking that this is the true explanation of the cross‑∨∨ correla‑
tions in the DCES case. First, the central measurement is a collider, which imme‑
diately puts the possibility of collider bias on the table. Second, the experimental 
correlations fail two intuitive tests for the existence of a genuine (cross‑∨∨ ) causal 
2 In an Appendix to a version of this paper available online [11], we ask what difference it makes to 
our conclusions if we abandon NoRA (i.e., permit retrocausality). We argue that it would eliminate this 
difference between ∨∨ geometries—that being an advantage—but in such a way as to make all of them 
vulnerable to CL. We note that this suggests new responses to some objections to retrocausal approaches, 
including an objection based on the possibility of iterated zig zag causality. These issues provide a fur‑
ther motivation for the main project of the paper, that of exploring the question of causal influence across 
∨∨ geometries.
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connection. We argue that taken together, these factors provide strong reasons to 
doubt cross‑∨∨ AAD in the DCES case.3
Up to this point, we will have been speaking about AAD, not ‘nonlocality’ or 
‘nonlocal causation’. This choice is deliberate, and in Sect.  4 we explain why we 
make it. Bell’s own formal notion of Local Causality (LC) [12] turns out to require 
particular care, in these contexts. When selection artifacts are in the offing, it is 
important to distinguish a version of LC expressed in terms of frequencies in post‑
selected ensembles from a version (Bell’s own) expressed in term of underlying fun‑
damental probabilities. In Sect. 4 we explain the need for this distinction, and then 
discuss the relation between the failure of cross‑∨∨ AAD and LC (in both senses).
In Sect. 5 we turn to a second variant of the Delft experiment, in which the entan‑
glement swapping occurs in the past of the measurements at the extremities of the 
∨∨ (i.e., in the overlap of their past light cones). As we will explain, this variant 
appears to avoid the Collider Loophole.
In Sect. 6, with these variants as comparisons, we return to the actual Delft exper‑
iment. In this case, as we noted, the entanglement swapping measurement occurs 
at spacelike separation from the two measurements between which the experiment 
claims to reveal AAD. This makes a difference, but we conclude that although the 
case for thinking that the experiment fails to close the Collider Loophole is not as 
straightforward as in the delayed choice version, the loophole remains a threat. Sec‑
tion 7, finally, is a brief conclusion.
2  Preliminaries
2.1  Entanglement Swapping
We introduce entanglement swapping by following a helpful recent presentation by 
Glick [15]. As Glick puts it:
Entanglement swapping is a procedure in which entanglement may be 
“swapped” from a pair of jointly measured particles to a pair of particles lack‑
ing common preparation. The technique has become quite commonplace in 
experiments involving entanglement and has numerous applications in quan‑
tum information theory. A simple experimental arrangement is depicted (in 
Fig. 1). [15, p. 16]
A similar procedure can be considered in which the measurement that induces 
the ‘swapping’ occurs in the absolute future of the side measurements by Alice and 
Bob. This is called delayed-choice entanglement swapping. As Glick describes it:
3 Readers may be familiar with a different concern about post‑selection in Bell experiments, a concern 
applicable in conventional ∨‑shaped experimental geometries. We emphasise that the issue we raise here 
is different, and arises specifically from the use of entanglement swapping. See footnote 8 below for a 
further comment on this distinction. (See also [14] for recent relevant work.)
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The procedure was proposed as a thought experiment by [16], but has now 
been realized experimentally by [17] and others. We begin with two entan‑
gled systems as in the ordinary case, but rather than have Victor perform his 
measurement prior to Alice and Bob, we delay particles 2 and 3 so that Vic‑
tor can perform his measurement after his colleagues. Recall that the argu‑
ment given above ...suggests that we should expect the same result as in the 
ordinary swapping case. In particular, when Victor successfully performs a 
BSM [Bell state measurement], entanglement will be swapped to (1,4). ... 
[T]hese results seem to have been confirmed by an experiment conducted by 
[17] depicted (in Fig. 2). [15, p. 17]
As Glick notes, this possibility seems to have peculiar consequences:
Fig. 1  Entanglement swapping 
(from [15])
Fig. 2  Delayed choice entanglement swapping ([15], after [17])
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This presents the following challenge: In the ordinary entanglement swap‑
ping case, Victor has the power to entangle (or not) the outer particles (1,4) 
at a distance. In the delayed‑choice case, it seems that Victor has the same 
power to entangle (1,4). However, at the time of Victor’s measurement (or 
choice), (1,4) have already been detected. Thus, Victor’s measurement must 
not only be capable of influence at a (spacelike) distance, but also back‑
wards in time. The only way Victor can entangle (1,4) is to act on them 
retrocausally when (or before) they are measured ( t ≤ MA,MB ). [15, p. 17]
Some writers (e.g., [16, 18]) propose that we avoid this appearance of retro‑
causality by adopting an antirealist view of the quantum state. If the quantum 
state does not represent a piece or property of reality, then there is no retrocausal‑
ity (or indeed any sort of causality) involved here, because there is no real effect. 
Victor’s measurement may change our knowledge of the past in some way, but it 
doesn’t affect the past.
Glick’s preferences are more realist. He proposes to defend a realist view of 
the quantum state by allowing timelike entanglement, considering several inter‑
pretations of the resulting timelike connection.
On this view, (1,4) are entangled at MA,MB in virtue of Victor’s later meas‑
urement (at MV ). Generalizing, a pair of particles in a DCES experiment 
are entangled only if there actually is a BSM performed in the future that 
swaps entanglement to them. Of course, one may not know whether such a 
measurement will be performed, and hence, may wish to leave it open that 
the particles one encounters may be entangled. But, this doesn’t trivialize 
entanglement as it still only applies to certain pairs of particles, namely, 
those prepared in an entangled state or entangled via other means (e.g., 
entanglement swapping). [15, pp. 19–20]
Glick discusses two variants of this view. One is that ‘Victor’s measurement has a 
retrocausal (or non‑causal influence) on the pair of particles (1,4) at t ≤ MA,MB .’ 
The other, which Glick calls ‘Nonseparability’, proposes that ‘Victor’s meas‑
urement gives rise to the (1,4) whole that Alice and Bob both measure.’ Glick 
acknowledges ‘difficulties in working out the details and timing of such pro‑
cesses’, but suggests that ‘these difficulties are by in large the same as those 
already faced by [similar] approaches in the context of spacelike entanglement.’
Glick notes that there is an alternative explanation of the correlations involved 
in DCES cases, one described by Egg [19]. Glick observes that Egg’s proposal 
provides a halfway house between the antirealism of Peres and Healey and his 
own realist view, and describes it as follows [15, p. 20]:
An alternative interpretation of DCES is given by Egg. Egg endeavours to 
provide a principled basis to accept the realist account of ordinary entan‑
glement swapping but reject its extension to DCES. Egg’s reply focuses on 
an aspect of Ma et al.’s DCES experiment that was omitted from the initial 
presentation. Unlike a simple EPR experiment, the correlations in the data 
recorded by Alice and Bob are only apparent once that data has been sorted 
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into subensembles according to the measurement performed and results 
obtained by Victor. Once we sort the results obtained by Alice and Bob in 
this way, we find that the subsets of data associated with Victor performing 
a BSM exhibit correlations that violate a Bell inequality. This leads Egg to 
conclude the following:
The Bell measurement on the [2,3] pair allows us to sort the [1,4] pairs into 
four subensembles corresponding to the four Bell states. Without delayed 
choice, this has physical significance, because each [1,4] pair really is in such 
a state after the [2,3] measurement. But if the [1,4] measurements precede the 
[2,3] measurement, the [1,4] pair never is in any of these states. This is entirely 
compatible with the fact that evaluating the [1,4] measurements within a cer‑
tain subensemble shows Bell‑type correlations. [19, p. 1133, original empha‑
sis, notation changed to match Glick]
As Glick says, ‘Egg’s proposal is that we should posit physical entanglement 
between (1,4) only when Victor’s measurement occurs before Alice’s and Bob’s 
( MV < MA,MB).’ Glick notes that this ‘allows one to preserve realism about entan‑
glement (and an ontic view of the quantum state more generally) without having to 
adopt the revisionary metaphysics’ that he himself proposes.
Egg’s analysis of the DCES cases seems to be a widespread view.4 The crucial 
point for our purposes is that if post‑selection is in play, existence of Bell Inequality‑
violating correlations in a subensemble of measurements need not be evidence of 
real entanglement. In a moment we will apply Egg’s analysis to a delayed‑choice 
version of the Delft experiment. Before that, we need to introduce some terminology 
from the causal modelling literature.
2.2  Collider Bias
In causal modelling terminology, a collider (or inverted fork) is a variable with more 
than one direct cause within a causal model. In other words, in the graphical format 
of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), it is a node at which two or more arrows con‑
verge (hence the term ‘collider’). It is well known that conditioning on such a vari‑
able – i.e., selecting the cases in which it takes a certain value – may induce a corre‑
lation between its causes, even if they are actually independent. As Cole et al put it, 
‘conditioning on the common effect imparts an association between two otherwise 
independent variables; we call this selection bias’ [22, p. 417].
Collider bias is sometimes called Berkson’s paradox [23]. Berkson’s own exam‑
ple involved an apparent negative dependence between diabetes and cholecystitis in 
patients admitted to hospital with certain symptoms. Such symptoms tended to be 
caused either by diabetes or by cholecystitis, so that presence of these symptoms is 
a collider, in causal modelling terms. In these patients, lack of one cause does make 
4 Fankhauser [20] develops a similar analysis for the case of the delayed‑choice quantum eraser; see also 
Gaasbeek [21].
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more probable the other cause, but Berkson’s point is that this is a biased sample. 
There need be no such correlation in the general population.
Here’s a simpler example, to lead us in the direction of quantum cases. Imagine 
that Alice and Bob are at spacelike separation, and play rock‑paper‑scissors with 
each other, sending their choices to a third observer, Charlie. Suppose that Alice 
and Bob make their choices entirely at random, and that Charlie records three kinds 
of outcomes: Alice wins, Bob wins, or neither wins. Obviously, post‑selecting on 
any one of these outcomes induces a correlation between Alice’s choices and Bob’s 
choices. Equally obviously, this does not amount to real causality between Alice and 
Bob.
3  The Delft Experiment and Variants
3.1  The Actual Experiment
The Delft experiment [1] adopts a proposal originally made by Bell himself [24]. 
Detection efficiency is improved by means of an ‘event‑ready’ measurement, whose 
function is to signal that two suitably entangled particles (in this case, electrons) 
are in the A and B detector channels. In the Deflt experiment, unlike in Bell’s own 
proposal, the event‑ready signal is provided by a particular outcome to a measure‑
ment that also serves to entangle the two electrons, via entanglement swapping. The 
experimental procedure is described as follows [1, p. 3]:
We generate entanglement between the two distant spins by entanglement 
swapping in the Barrett‑Kok scheme using a third location C (roughly midway 
between A and B ...). First we entangle each spin with the emission time of a 
single photon (time‑bin encoding). The two photons are then sent to location 
C, where they are overlapped on a beam‑splitter and subsequently detected. If 
the photons are indistinguishable in all degrees of freedom, the observation 
of one early and one late photon in different output ports projects the spins 
A and B into the maximally entangled state �−⟩ = (�↑↓⟩ − �↓↑⟩)∕
√
2 , where 
ms = 0 ≡ �↑⟩ , ms = −1 ≡ �↓⟩ . These detections herald the successful prepara‑
tion and play the role of the event‑ready signal in Bell’s proposed setup. ... [W]
e ensure that this event‑ready signal is space‑like separated from the random 
input bit generation at locations A and B.
In the Delft protocol, successful event‑ready detection results at the central point C 
select a (small) subensemble of the total series of trials E, a subensemble we denote 
by EC . These are the trials in which there is held to be successful entanglement 
swapping, ensuring that the electrons at A and B are entangled.
We note in passing that the Delft authors themselves take the view that, as they 
put it, ‘John Bell proved that no theory of nature that obeys locality and realism can 
reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory’, and hence that their own result 
‘rules out large classes of local realist theories’ [1, p. 1, emphasis added]. However, 
the claim that Bell’s Theorem requires an assumption of realism is controversial; 
see, e.g., Norsen [25] for the argument to the contrary. This is not directly relevant 
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to our present concerns, but we mention it to emphasise that our own challenge to 
AAD in Delft‑like experiments does not depend on this (claimed) realism loophole.
3.2  Delayed‑Choice Delftware
Let us now consider a DCES version of the Delft experiment, Delayed Delft (DD).5 
It differs from the original experiment in that the measurement C takes place later in 
time, in the future light cones of the measurements A and B. This experiment would 
be expected to yield the same result as the original, because the relevant joint prob‑
abilities are insensitive to the relative timings of the three experiments involved. In 
DD, as before, let EC denote the subensemble of all measurement results in which an 
event‑ready result is recorded at C. Let {an, bn,An,Bn} denote the nth result within 
EC . Here an is the setting of measurement A, An the outcome of measurement A, and 
so on, in the usual way.
3.2.1  Colliders in DD
In DD, it is uncontroversial that the measurement choices at A and B may exert a 
causal influence on the result of the measurement C. This is certainly so in orthodox 
QM, in which the measurements at A and B affect the state of the particles converg‑
ing on C from the left and right, respectively. (The fact that the measurements at A 
and B take place before that at C is crucial in this account, of course.)
In causal modelling terms, then, the outcome of the measurement C is a collider, 
for causal influences originating at A and B. This immediately puts on the table the 
possibility that any apparent AAD between A and B might be a manifestation of 
selection bias. We say ‘puts on the table’ here because in principle an association 
between A and B might result from a combination of selection bias at C and some 
real underlying causal influence between A and B.
The possibility that the apparent AAD between A and B might be a selection 
artifact is our Collider Loophole (CL). But it is one thing to identify a possibility, 
another to show that it is actually the case. How can we determine whether CL is the 
true explanation of the apparent AAD across DD? We will proceed by offering two 
tests for genuine causality, and explaining why DD seems to fail both tests.
3.2.2  The No Difference Test
The first test starts with this question. Would An or Bn have been different, if the 
measurement C had not (later) taken place?6 The intuitive answer to this question is 
5 Delft’s famous pottery is said to have originated as a seventeenth century imitation of Chinese porce‑
lain. It was such a good imitation that it was promptly imitated by others, producing what became known 
as English Delftware, Irish Delftware, etc. In the same respectful spirit we here propose a near‑copy of 
the Delft experiment, itself inspired by the work of the Irish master.
6 As a further refinement to the experiment, we might imagine that whether the measurement C takes 
place is itself determined by a randomiser, also in the absolute future with respect to A and B.
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‘No’. Because C lies in the future with respect to the measurements A and B, allow‑
ing it to influence the measurement results at A and B would amount to retrocausal‑
ity, which we are assuming is impossible (NoRA).
Yet answering ‘No’ leads to a puzzle. If each individual measurement at C makes 
no difference in this way, then it seems to follow that the entire set of C measure‑
ments makes no difference – in other words, that all the measurement results in EC 
would have been the same, even if the measurement device at C had simply been 
absent altogether. But these results display Bell correlations between A and B, and 
hence seem to constitute evidence of entanglement between the electrons A and B. 
How could such entanglement arise, if there is no measurement to provide entangle‑
ment swapping? Egg’s approach to DCES answers this question, telling us that the 
apparent entanglement is a selection artifact. The set of results EC is indeed just the 
same, whether or not C measurements take place, but there’s no real entanglement 
in either case.
It is easy to see how this reasoning extends to AAD. If the results in EC are inde‑
pendent of whether the C measurements actually take place, then the questions of 
AAD in the two cases—i.e., with and without the C measurements—stand and fall 
together. Either we are committed to AAD even in the absence of the C measure‑
ments, or we are not committed to it in the presence of the C measurements. And the 
latter is by far the more plausible option. Like entanglement itself, on the Egg view, 
the appearance of AAD is a selection artifact.
What we have just done is to take reasoning that supports the Egg view – the 
argument that in the absence of retrocausality, C can make no real physical differ‑
ence in the DECS case – and applied to the issue of AAD. Let’s call this the No 
Difference Argument (NDA) against AAD in DD. This is our first causal test, and we 
have argued that DD fails it. To get to our second causality test we’ll proceed indi‑
rectly, via a possible objection to NDA.
3.2.3  Thinking About Counterfactuals
NDA appealed to the assumption that the results in EC are independent of whether 
the future C measurements take place—that C makes no difference. A possible reply 
is that even if C doesn’t make a difference to the actual contents of EC , it might 
make a difference to the kind of counterfactuals that would support a claim of causal 
influence from A to B. If so, that might explain how a relation of causal dependence 
could exist in the presence of C that would not exist in its absence.
To explore this proposal, let’s think of an example. Let’s consider simply the 
extreme correlations, the ones that are relevant in the original EPR argument. Sup‑
pose that Alice chooses setting an = 0 , and is told that the case falls in EC.7 From the 
7 In case this supposition should seem controversial, we note that the argument in this paragraph could 
be phrased entirely from the point of view of the experimenter at C, so that it is this experimenter (here‑
after ‘Charlie’) who raises the question whether the case would have still be in EC , if Alice had chosen 
differently. We phrase it in Alice’s voice to stay as close as possible to the reasoning in the original EPR 
argument.
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fact that EC satisfies the Bell correlations, it follows that if Bob has chosen the same 
setting bn = 0 , then An = −Bn . In other words, in the spirit of the EPR argument, 
Alice knows something about the probabilities on Bob’s side of the experiment. If 
A = 1 , for example, then she knows that P(B = −1 ∣ bn = 0) = 1 . Now the crucial 
question. Does she also know that had she instead chosen an = 1 , she would have 
been able to predict the result of a measurement with bn = 1 with similar certainty? 
No—for she doesn’t know that the run of the experiment would have fallen within 
EC , in that counterfactual case. If we assume that it does so—if we hold fixed the 
result of the C measurement, in effect—then the reasoning goes through, but why 
should we be entitled to do that? Why should C not be sensitive to the choice of 
measurement setting at A, in a way that makes it possible that if Alice had chosen 
differently, the result of the C measurement might have been different? This thought 
will lead us in the direction of our second causality test.
3.2.4  The Counterfactual Fragility Test
NDA offered one reason for thinking that violation of Bell inequalities in DD should 
be seen as an artifact of post‑selection, rather than a manifestation of AAD. There is 
a second factor that points in the same direction. Any argument from a set of experi‑
mental data to causal dependence is going to require an assumption something like 
the following.
Alternative Measurements (AM)—It is legitimate to consider measurements 
which the experimenters might have performed, in addition to those which 
they actually perform. [26]
In this case, the assumption AM is formulated in a discussion of Bell‑style argu‑
ments, but the point is much more general. In the causal modelling framework, it 
is embodied in the assumption that exogenous variables may take a range of val‑
ues. If an ensemble of correlation data is to provide information about causation, it 
needs to respect such a principle. It needs to provide information about the results 
of alternative choices. But a post‑selected ensemble may fail to do so. It may be 
‘counterfactually fragile’, in the sense that it doesn’t support inferences about what 
would have happened, had an alternative measurement been performed. To support 
a causal claim, a set of data needs to be counterfactually robust.
Here’s a simple example. Suppose I record occasions on which it is true either 
that I wear green socks in the morning and it is sunny the same afternoon, or that 
I wear red socks in the morning and it is raining in the afternoon. ‘Look’, I claim, 
‘I can control the weather, at least in this subensemble of cases.’ What I’ve missed 
is that the selection method for the subensemble doesn’t respect AM, and is hence 
counterfactually fragile. Had I chosen the other sock colour the resulting case would 
not have been in the subensemble at all, in most cases.
It is easy to see how this kind of fragility might be present in the DD protocol. As 
we just observed, there is no guarantee that if A had chosen an alternative measure‑
ment setting in case {an, bn,An,Bn} , the resulting measurement would have been in 
the subensemble EC . Why not? Because there is no guarantee that the result of the 
measurement C would have been the same in that case. As we noted, conventional 
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QM takes it for granted that setting choices can influence each of the particles con‑
verging on the central vertex of the ∨∨   and in turn influence the outcome of the 
measurement at C.
The upshot is that the correlations within the subensemble EC may provide no 
guide to what An and/or Bn would have been, had an been different. If so, then the 
data provided by EC is not counterfactually robust, in the sense described above, and 
cannot support the causal claim of AAD. Let’s call this the Counterfactual Fragility 
Argument (CFA). It is our second causal test, and again, there are good grounds to 
think that DD fails it.
3.2.5  Summary: The Collider Loophole
We have argued that the case for cross‑∨∨ AAD in DD is vulnerable to the Col‑
lider Loophole (CL). In other words, Bell correlations revealed in the results of DD 
are likely to be an artifact of collider bias, rather than a sign of genuine AAD. It is 
uncontroversial that C is a collider in DD, and the diagnosis of collider bias is sup‑
ported by intuitive tests for causal dependence in two ways.
First, from the fact that C occurs later than A and B, and NoRA, we concluded 
that the results in the subensemble EC would have been the same, even if the C 
measurements had not taken place. NDA therefore undermines the claim that the 
correlations in EC reveal genuine AAD.
Second, the fact that C occurs later than A and B allows the measurement settings 
at A and B to influence the result of the measurement at C. But this means that EC 
may be counterfactually fragile. So CFA, too, undermines the claim that the Bell 
correlations in DD reflect any genuine causal dependency.
All of these points appealed to the fact that in DD, C lies in the absolute future of 
A and B. This suggests that CL would be avoided by a version of the Delft experi‑
ment that put C in the past with respect to A and B. We turn to that case in Sect. 5, 
before returning to the actual Delft experiment (which lies between these two vari‑
ants, in the sense that it puts C at spacelike separation to A and B).
We emphasise again that CL does not challenge AAD within each of the two 
wings of DD. In each of the wings we have a component with ∨ geometry, within 
which there is no further collider to generate selection bias.8 It may be that such 
‘mini‑AAD’ has a crucial role in the processes that make post‑selection possible in 
the ∨∨‑geometry as a whole, enabling the C measurement to ‘know about’ the A and 
B measurements. Our point is that this need not imply AAD across the ∨∨ from A to 
B or vice versa. The Collider Loophole stands in the way.
8 For clarity, we note that there is a different post‑selection loophole that is relevant within the ∨ geom‑
etry. As Blasiak et al explain [27], Bell experiments with this geometry always rely on some sort of post‑
selection—e.g., the fact that two particles were both detected in the same time bin—in generating their 
experimental data. These authors discuss the possibility that this kind of post‑selection creates experi‑
mental artifacts, and propose a criterion to eliminate this possibility. It requires that the post‑selection 
still be possible if we drop the data from any single post‑selection measurement. But the post‑selection at 
the intermediate vertex in the ∨∨ geometry of the Delft experiment cannot be eliminated.
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4  Connections to Bell’s Theorem
Before we turn to other variants of the Delft experiment, we want to clarify the 
relationship between the above discussion and Bell’s Theorem. As we said in 
Sect. 1, we have been using the term AAD deliberately, avoiding the term ’nonlo‑
cality’. We are now in a position to explain this choice.
Bell derived a family of inequalities from two mathematical assumptions, 
widely known as Local Causality (LC) and Statistical Independence (SI). When 
these inequalities are violated, as they are for the Bell correlations observed in 
the entanglement experiments we are discussing, at least one of these assump‑
tions must fail. It is instructive to ask how the Collider Loophole might accom‑
plish this, if there is to be no AAD across the ∨∨ as a whole.
LC is formalized by Bell himself [12, 25] as a conditional independence (or 
screening) condition between two spacelike‑separated wings of an experiment. 
Norsen describes Bell’s own account of LC with reference to the diagram repro‑
duced here as Fig. 3, adapted from Bell [12]. Norsen’s caption for this diagram 
reads as follows:
Spacetime diagram illustrating the various beables of relevance for the 
EPR‑Bell setup. ... Separated observers Alice (in region 1) and Bob (in 
region 2) make spin‑component measurements (using apparatus settings 
a and b respectively) on a pair of spin‑ or polarization‑entangled particles 
(represented by the dashed lines). The measurements have outcomes A and 
B respectively. The state of the particle pair in region 3 is denoted  . Note 
that what we are here calling region 3 extends across the past light cones 
of both regions 1 and 2. It thus not only “completely shields off from 1 the 
overlap of the backward light cones of 1 and 2”, but also vice versa. Bell’s 
local causality condition therefore requires both that b and B are irrelevant 
for predictions about the outcome A, and that a and A are irrelevant for pre‑
dictions about the outcome B, once  is specified.
As Norsen goes on to say:
Fig. 3  Bell’s notion of Local Causality (from [25])
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A complete specification of beables in this region 3 will therefore, according 
to Bell’s concept of local causality, “make events in 2 irrelevant for predictions 
about 1” and will also make events in 1 irrelevant for predictions about 2.
In formal terms, LC may thus be written:
In the same terminology, Statistical Independence (SI) between the settings (a, b) 
and the prior state of the system (  ) is the following condition:
Norsen emphasises the character of the probabilities that Bell has in mind in his 
definition of LC.
Bell has deliberately and carefully formulated a local causality criterion that 
... is ... stated explicitly in terms of probabilities—the fundamental, dynami-
cal probabilities assigned by stochastic theories to particular happenings in 
space-time. Note in particular that the probabilities in Eq. (1) are not subjec‑
tive (in the sense of denoting the degree of someone’s belief in a proposition 
...), they cannot be understood as reflecting partial ignorance about relevant 
beables in region 3, and they do not (primarily) represent empirical frequen-
cies for the appearance of certain values .... They are, rather, the fundamental 
“output” of some candidate (stochastic) physical theory. [25, p. 10, emphasis 
added]
We call attention to Norsen’s distinction between two notions of probability because 
it turns out to be a helpful way to make the point that when post‑selection is in play, 
LC and SI may each be applied in two different ways, within the same model.
Let’s begin with a toy example. With reference to Fig. 3, imagine that Alice and 
Bob (in regions 1 and 2, respectively) each generate ordered pairs of (genuinely) 
random bits and send them to a third observer, Charlie, in their absolute future. 
Think of the first of each pair of bits as a ‘setting’ and the second as an ‘outcome’. 
Let Charlie perform a binary measurement on each pair of ordered pairs of bits, the 
producing positive results with probabilities based on the Bell correlations. Select‑
ing for positive outcomes at C will then generate an ensemble of results of the form 
{an, bn,An,Bn} . Denote this ensemble EC , as before.
The selection procedure guarantees that the ensemble EC violates a Bell inequal‑
ity. Bell’s Theorem therefore implies that either LC or SI must fail, within this 
ensemble of results. But SI is guaranteed by the assumption that the settings are 
genuinely random bits, so the effect of post‑selection must be to induce an LC‑vio‑
lating correlation between the two sides of the experiment, conditional on  . In other 
words, at least one of the following must hold:
(1)
P(A ∣ a, b,B, ) =P(A ∣ a, ),
P(B ∣ a, b,A, ) =P(B ∣ b, ).
(2)P( ∣ a, b) = P()
(3)
Pps(A ∣ a, b, ) ≠ Pps(A ∣ a, )
Pps(B ∣ a, b, ) ≠ Pps(B ∣ b, )
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where Pps denotes probability (i.e, in this case, frequency) within the post‑selected 
ensemble.
Let us call this result a violation of LCps , adding the subscript to remind ourselves 
where the probabilities involved originate. Does this violation of LCps reflect any 
real causality between A and B? Clearly not. It is simply an artifact of collider bias. 
Alice’s and Bob’s pairs of bits are joint causes of the outcome of Charlie’s measure‑
ment, and that’s the source of the correlation. Equally clearly, the violation of LCps 
does not imply any violation of LC as interpreted in terms of the underlying dynami‑
cal probabilities of the model. (Let us write LCdp for this case.) In this toy example, 
these fundamental probabilities are those involved in the stipulation that Alice and 
Bob generate genuinely random bits, so that LCdp is trivially satisfied:
The need to distinguish LCdp and LCps explains our caution about using the term 
‘nonlocality’. This simple example shows that in the presence of post‑selection, 
we may have nonlocality in the sense of failure of LCps (call this ‘ nonlocalityps’), 
without nonlocality in the sense of failure of LCdp . As the example illustrates, 
nonlocalityps does not imply AAD, or genuine causality.9
This lesson carries over to DD. The diagnosis of the Bell correlations offered 
by the Collider Loophole excludes cross‑∨∨ AAD, but it is not incompatible with 
nonlocalityps . DD may well exhibit nonlocalityps , despite respecting LCdp itself. 
In other words, the distinction between LCdp and LCps explains how it can be true 
both (i) that a failure of LC explains the Bell correlations observed in DD, and (ii) 
that the experiment exhibits no cross‑∨∨ nonlocal causation. The apparent tension 
between these claims dissolves when we realise that they rely on different applica‑
tions of LC, (i) relying on the LCps sense and (ii) relying on the LCdp sense.
Now to SI. Failure of Bell inequalities in DD requires that one of LC and SI fails, 
and we have been considering the possibility that it is LC, in the form LCps . How‑
ever, SI might also fail in a post‑selected ensemble. After all, the geometry of DD 
allows the central measurement to be informed of the remote measurement settings 
at A and B via a classical channel. This post‑selection might induce a correlation 
between a and b and  , violating SIps (where, again, the subscript makes explicit that 
we are referring to the post‑selected ensemble). Again, violation of SIps need not 
imply a violation of SIdp.
Indeed, a small modification of the toy example above illustrates this possibil‑
ity. Suppose now that the random bits interpreted as outcomes in that example are 
generated as a pair A, B at the source marked with a star in Fig. 3, and this pair is 
sent directly to Charlie. Alice and Bob each generate a random ‘setting’ bit, a and 
(4)
Pdp(A ∣ a, b,B, ) = Pdp(A ∣ a, ) = 0.5,
Pdp(B ∣ a, b,A, ) = Pdp(B ∣ b, ) = 0.5.
9 Astute readers will have noticed that we have exaggerated the difference between the two kinds of 
probability Pps and Pdp , in order to make the distinction between LCps and LCdp more striking. Pps could 
also be explained in terms of the underlying dynamical probabilities, Pps simply resulting from Pdp by 
conditioning on an outcome of the measurement at C.
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b, respectively, and send these to Charlie. Charlie post‑selects, as before, to yield 
a subensemble EC violating a Bell inequality. Once again, this implies correla‑
tions between a and B and/or between b and A, within the post‑selected ensemble. 
Because the pair A, B now falls within  , however, these correlations manifest as a 
failure of SIps , not as a failure of LCps.
These toy examples suggest that in any real experiment in which apparent AAD 
is an artifact of collider bias, the precise explanation in terms of LCps and SIps is 
likely to be model‑dependent. For this reason we will not discuss these issues fur‑
ther in this piece. We will continue to speak of AAD, rather than ‘nonlocality’, to 
avoid the need to keep in mind the distinction between LCdp and LCps.
5  Early Delftware
We now turn to the case in which the measurement C is in the absolute past of A 
and B (Fig. 4), a case we’ll call Early Delft (ED).10 In this case, the geometry seems 
to do a much better job of avoiding CL. The assumption NoRA ensures that A and 
B are not causes of C, at least partially removing the threat that C is a collider, and 
hence a source of collider bias. (We say ‘partially’ because C is still a collider with 
respect to influences from the two sources. More on this below.)
More importantly, our two causal tests no longer seem a threat. In DD, the first 
test, NDA, relied on the claim that all the individual results in EC would have been 
Fig. 4  Early Delftware (entanglement swapping in the past)
10 This is the geometry of three loophole‑free experiments that followed the original result from Delft 
[2–4].
1 3
Foundations of Physics          (2021) 51:105  Page 17 of 24   105 
the same, even if the C measurements had not been made. But that claim relied on 
NoRA; and NoRA cuts no ice in ED, obviously, where C is earlier than A and B.
As for the second test, CFA, it relied in DD on the possibility that the choice of 
measurement settings at A and B could influence C, at least in principle. As a result, 
we were not entitled to infer that a given result would still have been in EC , even 
if Alice had chosen a different measurement. That was why EC was susceptible to 
counterfactual fragility. But now, given NoRA, the measurement choices at A and B 
cannot influence C. CFA is blocked.
5.1  Determined Scepticism?
At this point, we introduce a character we’ll call the AAD Sceptic, whose mission 
in life is to find small loopholes in arguments for AAD. Concerning ED, the AAD 
Sceptic objects that although passing the two causal tests blocks two arguments 
against AAD in ED, it doesn’t actually confirm that there is AAD in ED. After 
all (the Sceptic continues), there’s still a collider of some kind in ED—the central 
measurement at C is presumably a joint effect of the events that supply the particles 
from left and right. As in DD, ED will only yield Bell correlations when we condi‑
tion on the result of the measurement at C. Moreover, the correlations as a whole in 
ED are exactly the same as in DD, where we’ve agreed that there’s a strong case for 
saying that there isn’t AAD. In the light of this, isn’t it weird to think that a small 
difference in C’s location could make such a big difference to the causal structure of 
the case?
How should we meet this argument? One strategy would be to appeal to Bell’s 
Theorem, where ED permits a straightforward application of Bell’s own reasoning. 
Consider Fig. 5, where the measurement C occurs in the past lightcones of A and 
B. Unlike in DD, this measurement can be considered part of the preparation of 
the final two‑particle system, contributing to correlations in  . The violation of Bell 
inequalities observed between A and B therefore implies that one of the assumptions 
LC and SI must fail, in the corresponding ensemble of results.
In the light of our discussion in Sect.  4, however, it is clear that this won’t be 
enough to convince the AAD Sceptic. The Sceptic will repeat that even in ED, 
Bell correlations are only revealed in subensembles, corresponding to particular 
results of the measurement at C. So ED still gives us only a violation of LCps , not a 
Fig. 5  Early Delft in Bell’s framework (adapted from a diagram in [13])
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violation of LCdp . There’s still a collider of some kind at C, so why should a viola‑
tion of LCps be enough to guarantee AAD? It wasn’t in DD.
To meet this challenge, we need to identify some difference between the nature of 
the colliders in DD and ED—something that will explain how Bell correlations can 
be a selection artifact in DD but not in ED. The crucial point seems to be the differ‑
ence in the causal relationship between the measurement settings at A and B and the 
outcome at C, in the two cases. In DD, as we’ve seen, it is uncontroversial that the 
measurement settings at A and B may themselves be contributing causes to the out‑
come at C. This means that the settings themselves ‘feed into’ the collider at C. In a 
conventional QM picture, this happens because the measurements at A and B affect 
the state of the other particle in the corresponding pair, before those particles arrive 
at C. Intuitively, we might say that this feeds information about the settings at A and 
B in the direction of C.
In ED, however, the conventional picture has information, or causal influence, 
flowing the other way—from the measurement C to the particles due to be measured 
at A and B. Intuitively, this makes C a simpler kind of collider. Without input from 
the measurement settings, it simply isn’t rich enough to generate Bell correlations by 
post‑selection.
We have some sympathy with the AAD Sceptic in thinking that it’s counterin‑
tuitive that a small difference in the location of C could make such a big difference 
to the causal structure of a ∨∨‑geometry Bell experiment. However, the difference 
between ED and DD certainly isn’t negligible. Sitting between them is the third case, 
in which C is spacelike separated from A and B. If there’s any merit in the Sceptic’s 
point, it might be expected to emerge from the three‑way comparison between ED, 
DD, and this intermediate case. This brings us nicely to the actual Delft experiment, 
which has this intermediate geometry.
6  The Collider Loophole in the Actual Delft Experiment
Recapping the argument so far, we have considered two variants of the Delft experi‑
ment. We argued that in one (DD) but not apparently the other (ED), CL would be a 
significant challenge to the claim that its results provided evidence of AAD, across 
the ∨∨ geometry concerned. With these two variants of the Delft experiment as com‑
parison cases, we now return to the actual Delft experiment.
As just noted, the actual Delft experiment is an intermediate case between ED 
and DD, in the sense that the C measurements are at a spacelike separation to the 
corresponding A and B measurements. As [1, 3] say, they ‘ensure that [the] event‑
ready signal is space‑like separated from the random input bit generation at loca‑
tions A and B’. Where does this leave it? Is it troubled by the Collider Loophole, 
like DD, or safe from it, like ED?
As we shall see, this question turns out to be quite subtle. It is also in one sense 
moot, because we now have three similar Bell tests with the ED geometry [2–4]. But 
the Delft experiment was the first Bell test to use this technique, and so for historical 
as well as metaphysical reasons, it is interesting to ask on which side of the line it 
falls. Was there really AAD ‘across the ∨∨ ’ in Delft in 2015?
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Let’s see how far we can push the case for the Collider Loophole in this case. 
Could the correlations in EC be merely a selection artifact, as in DD? Can we still 
use NDA to argue that they would have been the same, even if C had not taken 
place? In DD we appealed to NoRA to argue that the C measurements makes no dif‑
ference to the A and B measurements. As a substitute we might now try to appeal to 
a principle of ‘no spacelike causality’, calling on the authority of special relativity in 
a familiar way.
There’s a very obvious objection to such an appeal in this context, but set that 
aside for the moment. If we could appeal to such a principle, it would again tell 
us that the A and B measurements would have been the same without the C meas‑
urements, and hence that the actual subensemble EC would have involved the same 
correlations, even without C. As before, no one would claim that there would be 
genuine AAD from A to B without C; so this would be enough to cast doubt on the 
claim that the correlations in EC reveal genuine AAD, even in the case in which we 
do have the C measurements.
Summing up, a no spacelike causality principle leaves the Delft experiment vul‑
nerable to NDA. On the other hand, it provides some protection against CFA. With‑
out spacelike causality, the A and B measurement choices cannot affect the result 
of the C measurement, which was the main source of concern about counterfactual 
fragility. So the news for the Delft experiment would be mixed: continuing vulner‑
ability to NDA, but protection against CFA. CL would still be a concern.11
The obvious objection set aside a moment ago is that, as Bell himself has shown 
us, QM implies that there is spacelike causality. So we can’t glibly assume its 
absence, in this context. Unfortunately for the project of extracting a watertight case 
for AAD from the Delft experiment, this point cuts both ways. If we can’t exclude 
the possibility that the C measurement makes a difference to the A and B measure‑
ments, we can’t exclude the possibility that the A and B measurement settings make 
a difference to the result of the C measurement. And that leads us vulnerable to 
counterfactual fragility. We can’t assume that if an had been different, the instance in 
question would still have fallen within EC.
6.1  A Preferred Frame to the Rescue?
Does it help the case for AAD if we allow a preferred frame, and then revert to our 
previous assumption—no retrocausality, in the sense of the preferred frame?12 This 
does indeed help if C is earlier than A and B in the preferred frame. Then C may 
make a difference to A and B, so that we can’t assume that EC would have been just 
the same, without the C measurements. And yet A and B can’t make a difference 
11 At this point we might improve the news by a move we proposed in Sect.  3.2.3—more on this in 
Sect. 6.1.2 below.
12 Without a preferred frame, NoRA itself excludes spacelike causality, a point noted by Einstein as 
early as 1907. Bell [13, p. 235] cites a discussion by Einstein in which Einstein observes that spacelike 
causality would imply retrocausality in some frames.
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to C, weakening the case for an appeal to counterfactual fragility. With both causal 
tests blocked, the Collider Loophole seems sealed, just as in ED.13
This approach suffers from the disadvantage of needing a preferred frame, but 
that’s a cost that many in the field are in any case reconciled to paying. Setting that 
cost aside, does it provide the Delft experiment with a complete solution to the chal‑
lenges of CL? We want to identify two arguments for pessimism. The first is our rea‑
son for concluding that the Delft experiment cannot entirely evade CL. The outcome 
of the second argument is less clear. We think it raises issues that deserve to be put 
on the table in this context, but we also propose a way to escape it.
6.1.1  Which is the Preferred Frame?
The first argument turns on the observation that it is going to be difficult, probably 
impossible, to exclude the possibility that in the actual experiment, C is in the future 
of A and B with respect to the preferred frame. That option inherits the problems of 
DD, not the safety of ED. Who is to say which of all the possible preferred frames is 
the ‘true’ preferred frame? Without an answer to that question, the Delft experiment 
can’t exclude the possibility that its actual results are a selection artifact.14
In case the reader feels tempted to wave this concern aside, it is worth empha‑
sising that the Delft experiment belongs to a decades‑long project of closing what 
many have seen as tiny loopholes in the experimental case for quantum AAD. It 
would hardly be in the spirit of that project simply to wave aside this new concern, 
arising from the experimental undetectability of the assumed preferred frame.
6.1.2  Does the Argument for AAD Beg the Question?
The second argument turns on the question whether an argument for AAD based 
on the Delft experiment begs the question, even granting a preferred frame. To 
avoid NDA—i.e., the challenge that EC would have been just the same without the 
C measurements—it was necessary to allow that the C measurements might make 
a difference to the A and B measurements. But in the spacelike case—i.e., in the 
actual Delft experiment—such an influence of C on A and B would itself be a case 
of AAD. This leaves the argument in a delicate position. Unless it already assumes 
AAD from C to A and C to B, it is unable to meet a challenge to its claim to estab‑
lish AAD between A and B. This looks dangerously like a logical circle.
It might be replied that we already have evidence for AAD in the two component 
wings of the experiment (from C to A, and from C to B), and that we are entitled 
to rely on this evidence to block a challenge to the claim that the experiment dem‑
onstrates AAD from A to B. But if that’s the way the logic works, it deserves to 
13 The assumption of no retrocausality with respect to the preferred frame will also do the work that 
NoRA does in blocking the AAD Sceptic in Sect. 5.1.
14 When we introduced CFA in Sect. 3.2.4, it was important that C was in the future lightcone of A and 
B. This would not be the case here, but the present line of thought assumes that only time‑order, not 
lightcones, determine allowed causal influences. So the earlier arguments would still apply, with ‘future 
lightcone’ simply replaced by ‘future relative to the preferred frame’.
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be made explicit. Again, there’s a question as to whether it is good enough, by the 
lights of the project of making the case for AAD completely watertight. Imagine 
again our AAD Sceptic, keen to exploit any possible loophole to try to refute AAD. 
Such an opponent is hardly going to be convinced by a proposed reason for setting 
aside CL, if that proposal assumes AAD somewhere else.
In our view, a better reply is to appeal to an suggestion we considered in 
Sect. 3.2.3. There, we proposed that even if C doesn’t make a difference to the actual 
contents of EC , it might make a difference to the kind of counterfactuals needed to 
support a claim of causal influence from A to B. In the context of DD, this proposal 
didn’t seem to work. On the contrary, the fact that A and B might influence C gave 
us a reason to think that the counterfactuals needed would not hold—that led us to 
CFA.
In the present context, however, a ban on AAD would prevent the A and B meas‑
urement settings from affecting C, saving the counterfactuals. This gives the Delft 
experiment an answer to the AAD Sceptic. If the Sceptic were right, we would be 
able to appeal to this different way of meeting the causality tests. This seems to 
avoid the charge that the inference from the Delft results to AAD is begging the 
question, though it is a subtle matter, and we think that the reasoning needs to be 
made clear. Let’s lay out the reasoning explicitly: 
1. Assume for the sake of the argument that the AAD Sceptic is right, and hence that 
there is no AAD anywhere in the Delft experiment (either in the wings or across 
the ∨∨).
2. Then the move proposed in Sect. 3.2.3 (see also fn. 11) protects the Delft argu‑
ment from NDA and CFA. With these causality tests met, the observed violation 
of the Bell inequality shows that the AAD Sceptic and Assumption 1 are wrong.
3. This shows that there is AAD somewhere, but this isn’t a complete ‘bridge 
repair’— i.e., a complete defence of AAD across the ∨∨–because the AAD might 
be only in the wings. However, it does protect the Delft argument against the 
charge that that it is begging the question.
6.2  Summary: CL in the Actual Delft Experiment
Summarising our discussion, the best prospect for defending the Delft experiment 
against CL lies in the assumption of a preferred frame, and reliance on NoRA with 
respect to this frame. So long as C is earlier than A and B with respect to the pre‑
ferred frame, the argument for AAD in the Delft experiment escapes CL, and avoids 
passes the causal tests NDA and CF, in the same way as in the case of ED.
However, the cost of this move—setting aside the theoretical cost of reliance on a 
preferred frame—is that safety from CL becomes experimentally unconfirmable. In 
any actual version of the Delft experiment, it would simply be unknown whether the 
required condition was satisfied.
In addition—echoing the AAD Sceptic’s point in Sect. 5.1 about the difference 
between ED and DD—we note that reliance on a preferred frame commits us to a 
sudden and unobservable change in the causal structure of the experiment, as the 
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spatiotemporal location of C varies with respect to that of A and B. Again, many in 
the field may feel that this is not much of a cost, because they are committed to such 
things for other reasons. Think of the sensitivity of the causal structure of a regular 
∨‑shaped EPR‑Bell experiment to the time‑order of measurements, in any collapse 
model. In our view, it is worth asking whether there are models that avoid this con‑
sequence, especially given that the experimental correlations are independent of the 
temporal location of C.15
7  Conclusion
The use of entanglement swapping in Bell tests introduces an additional loophole 
into arguments from violation of the Bell inequalities to AAD. Under conventional 
assumptions—i.e., excluding retrocausality—the sensitivity of such experiments to 
this Collider Loophole depends on the temporal relation between the entanglement‑
swapping measurement C and the measurements A and B. CL a threat if the C is in 
the future of A and B, but not if it is in the past. The Delft experiment is the interme‑
diate case, in which the separation is spacelike. We argued that this leaves it vulner‑
able to CL, unable to confirm experimentally that it avoids it.
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